Nuclear Arms Control

JAI’s extensive background in the basic nuclear technologies, the operation of nuclear facilities, and safeguards positions the company to make meaningful contributions to the implementation of nuclear arms control objectives.

There are three areas within the category of nuclear arms control (in addition to the safeguarding of nuclear materials) in which JAI has the demonstrated capability to contribute:

• Disposition of uranium and plutonium from weapons dismantlement. The reductions in the nuclear weapons inventories of both the United States and Russia requires the disposition of all contained highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, and the need for techniques for inspection and verification of these activities. Disposition of HEU can be effected by dilution with natural or depleted uranium of the isotopic content of uranium to levels below that viable for weapons purposes. Disposition of plutonium is more difficult; it can be diluted with inert materials, immobilized, and disposed of in a geological repository -- or it can be made into mixed-oxide fuels for use in commercial nuclear reactors. Both the HEU and plutonium must be maintained in protective storage before and during any such processing operations.
• Disposition of spent fuel and waste from decommissioning Russian nuclear submarines. In Russia there is a need for technologies (and funds) for decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear submarines, including storage of associated spent fuel and the treatment and storage of solid and liquid radioactive wastes. While a number of nuclear submarines have been removed from service, Russia has inadequate funds to decommission and dismantle them. Thus, the U.S. and other countries are providing financial and technical assistance to facilitate this decommissioning effort.
• Export control. The development and production of nuclear weapons requires a variety of materials, equipment, and technologies for construction and operation of processing facilities and for the production of sensitive equipment. Many of these are common to a variety of chemical and manufacturing processes, while some are unique to nuclear separations processes and the fabrication of key items of sensitive equipment. Thus, the U.S. and a number of international regimes have undertaken to establish export control lists for materials and equipment that prospectively have a “dual use” -- one of which is legitimate commercial use and the other is use in the development and production of nuclear weapons. The U.S. also has its own controls for the export of sensitive technologies.

Included in the services that JAI can provide in connection with the foregoing are the following:

• PROCESS AND FACILITY DESIGN AND OPERATION FOR DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIALS
• HEU conversion (and isotopic dilution)
• Fuel fabrication (including MOX)
• Scrap processing (U and Pu)
• Spent fuel reprocessing (separations processes)
• Spent fuel storage and disposal
• Preparation of uranium, plutonium, and thorium compounds, metals and alloys
• VERIFICATION
• Development of inspection and audit procedures
• Performance of inspections and audits
• Resolution of data or material anomalies
• EXPORT CONTROL
• Identification of candidate commodities for inclusion on a control list
• Assessment of commodities on a control list for possible exclusion from export
• Identification of sensitive technologies that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons or naval propulsion programs.
• Analysis of requests for authorization to export sensitive technologies
• Analysis of impacts of foreign visitors and foreign travel on the prospective proliferation of sensitive information
• Support to negotiation of agreements and procedures for use by international export control regimes
• Export control training